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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0000O0000 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
d/b/a LDS HOSPITAL, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and MARY JEAN ORTEGA, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 14690 
• 0000O0000 • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ORIGINAL ACTION TO REVIEW THE PROCEEDINGS AND 
ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a temporary order of the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah awarding workmen1s compensation benefits 
to claimant Mary Jean Ortega against petitioner Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The claim of defendant Ortega against plaintiff was 
heard by the defendant Commission, after which Mrs. Ortega 
appeared before a medical panel which subsequently issued a 
report. Based on the report, the Industrial Commission issued 
a temporary order, subsequently amended, which awarded temporary 
-1-
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total disability payments and medical payments to defendant 
Ortega pending a final determination on the issue of permanent 
partial disability, 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the orders issued by 
respondent Industrial Commission of Utah appealed in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Claimant Mary Jean Ortega was employed by petitioner 
Intermountain Health Care (hereafter Intermountain) as a laborer 
in the laundry operation of the LDS Hospital when she strained 
her back lifting large laundry bags on the evening of November 11, 
1970. She had been so employed for approximately two years prior 
to this injury. Following the accident, Mrs. Ortega undertook a 
full course of treatment at Intermountainfs facilities for the 
physical aspects of the injury, and no claim relating to this 
therapy is presented herein. The source of the dispute underly-
ing this appeal concerns a psychological complication that 
developed subsequent to the injury known as a "functional over-
lay". In Mrs. Ortega's case it involves a continuation and 
increase in the pain that originally attended the physical 
injury. Regarding this condition, the physician treating Mrs. 
Ortega's physical injury submitted the following comment to 
Intermountain's insurance adjuster: 
"... a certainly large amount of her pain is 
psychological in origin. This does not mean that it 
does not seem to be real to her. She will not return 
to work. These are always difficult problems, espe-
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cially since the patient probably will not get well 
with ordinary physical means and psychological evalua-
tion and counseling is indicated.M (emphasis added by 
Industrial Commission) 
In regard to the functional overlay problem, the 
medical panel appointed by the Industrial Commission made a 
preliminary finding that Mrs. Ortega was thirty per cent perma-
nently partially disabled; ten per cent of which was a pre-
existing condition, with the remaining twenty per cent being 
attributable to the accident of November 11th while working 
for Intermountain. Considering the medical panelTs report 
along with the other evidence relating to the claimants condi-
tion, the Industrial Commission found that Mrs. Ortega was 
temporarily totally disabled and is now permanently partially 
disabled, although it expressly reserved a final determination 
of the degree of permanent impairment pending the course of 
psychiatric treatment which the medical panel indicated could 
lead to a significant improvement in Mrs. OrtegaTs condition. 
Accordingly, the Industrial Commission entered an order direct-
ing Intermountain to pay Mrs. Ortega a sum for temporary total 
disability until her psychiatrist releases her as fit for work, 
and a sum for treatment of the psychological disability excluding 
that relating to family or marital counseling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED AS AMENDED 1953, 35-1-69 DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION APPORTION THE COSTS OF 
TREATMENT IN THE MANNER REQUESTED BY INTERMOUNTAIN. 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The case law interpreting U.C.A. 35-1-69 has not 
held that the Industrial Commission must apportion the costs 
of its award in cases such as presented here. As authority 
for its decision, the Industrial Commission cited the case 
of Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 
740 (1967). The plaintiff there was a fireman who had a pre-
existing heart ailment which developed into a severe anginal 
attack while on route to a fire. The Commission denied Powers 
claim for compensation on the grounds that no compensible indus-
trial accident had occurred. In holding that the incident 
of claimant's anginal attack was an industrial accident, this 
court stated at page 743, of 427 P.2d: 
TfThe law is well settled that the aggravation 
or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an in-
dustrial accident is compensible and that an inter-
nal failure brought about by exertion in the course 
of employment may be an accident within the meaning 
of the act." (Citing Jones v. California Packing 
Corporation, 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; and Purity 
Biscut Company v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 
201 P.2d 961). 
Intermountain argues that the Powers case is inapposite 
because it does not discuss the issue of apportionment but instead 
turns solely on the question of whether an aggravated injury is 
compensible. At page 4 of its brief, petitioner insists that Mrs. 
Ortega makes no argument that this is an aggravation of a pre-
existing problem. Petition then argues that even if applicable, 
the holding in Powers is that the aggravation alone is compensible, 
not the pre-existing difficulty. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Petitioner's argument attempting to distinguish the 
Powers case is clearly inaccurate. First the medical board's 
findings are that of Mrs. Ortega's thirty per cent psychological 
disability, ten per cent is attributable to pre-existing factors. 
Petitioner so states at pages 4, 5 and 6 of its brief. Moreover, 
Intermountain's primary argument in this appeal is that it 
should have to pay only for a portion of claimant's psychological 
disability because part of it existed prior to employment. 
If the condition existed to a certain extent prior to the acci-
dent, then it is necessarily true that the subsequent injury 
aggravated it. 
Second, nowhere in the Powers opinion does this court 
say that in cases where pre-existing conditions are aggravated 
there must be apportionment of damages since the employer is 
liable only to the degree to which the preceding condition 
was aggravated. In fact, the opinion states only that the 
Industrial Commission's Order denying Powers claim is reversed 
and on remand the Industrial Commission found Powers one hundred per 
cent disabled and assessed all liability against the employer 
without any apportionment. (See Order of July 13, 1967). 
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the Powers case is 
largely determinative of the issues presented in this appeal. 
Like Powers, Mrs. Ortega came to* work with a condition that 
rendered her abnormally sensitive to the type of injury she 
sustained, but which did not effect her job performance prior 
-5-
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1 
to the injury itself. Actually, Mrs. Ortega's case is even 
stronger on the facts than Powers since his pre-existing heart g 
condition was so severe that it was triggered by the normal 
stresses of the job and not by a separate accident. In addition, 
the Industrial Commission follows the Powers case in measuring 4 
the amount of compensible aggravation by comparing Mrs. OrtegaTs 
present condition against the degree of her disablement prior 
to the injury of November 11th. In this regard, disability 4 
can be measured by two different standards of which the medical 
panel's findings is one and the other is the more practical 
and concrete consideration of how much one's capacity to work 4 
is limited before and after the injury. This clearly is the 
standard applied by this court in Powers in measuring the degree 
of aggravation. In adopting this second standard for measuring < 
compensation, this court and the Industrial Commission have 
interpreted 35-1-69 to apply only when the disability operates 
as a measurable handicap upon one's ability to work at the < 
time the individual commences employment. Therefore, unless 
Intermountain can show that Mrs. Ortega's work performance 
was ten per cent deficient prior to the accident, they cannot ! 
claim the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in order-
ing Intermountain to pay all costs of Mrs. Ortega's psychologi-
cal treatment. 
The case of McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 551 P.2d 
504 (Utah 1976), cited by petitioner, provides additional authority 
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for application of the work comparison standard by disallowing 
the use of a percentage based finding - such as that produced 
by the Industrial Commission's medical panel - in a case where 
the Industrial Commission's award was apportioned between the 
employer and the State's Special Injury Fund under provisions 
of 3 5-1-69. 
Furthermore, the Industrial Commission has appor-
tioned the expenses relating to treatment of Mrs. Ortega's 
functional overlay disability, only it has done so according 
to the work disability comparison standard and in a manner 
consistent with this court's command in McPhie. It did so 
by specifically excluding from Intermountain's liability any 
counseling related to family or marital problems. Such domestic 
difficulties were identified by the treating psychiatrist as 
the other significant aspect of claimant's psychological pro-
blems. Thus, the Commission has not placed on Intermountain 
any liability which does not relate in some manner to the injury 
resulting from Mrs. Ortega's employment. 
Finally, it is important to note that the Industrial 
Commission's findings in respect to Mrs. Ortega's disabilities 
are not final. As was mentioned previously, due to the strong 
potential for improvement in her psychiatric profile as treat-
ment proceeds, the present finding of thirty per cent functional 
disability will likely be revised downward in the future. 
It is entirely plausible that the ultimate finding would be 
that claimant is ten per cent disabled, which disability relates 
-7-
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only to domestic factors, and which presents no immediate impair-
ment of Mrs. Ortega's ability to work, and so release petitioner 
from further liability. Intermountain is thus jumping the 
gun in claiming that it has been saddled with an unfair final 
order since that order is subject to continuous review and 
modification. Regardless of what the final order of the Indus-
trial Commission finds, Intermountain at present is being ordered 
to pay only for treatment of Mrs. Ortega1s perception of pain, 
liability for which it is clearly in no position to deny. 
Intermountain cites Hafers, Inc. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 526 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1974); and Halvorson, Inc. v. Williams, 
19 Utah 2d 113, 426 P.2d 1019 (1967) for the proposition that 
this court denies apportionment only when it finds no pre-exist-
ing conditions. However, these cases turn solely on the question 
of whether the Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily in finding 
that there was no pre-existing disability based on the evidence 
presented in each case. Since the Commission's orders, not 
its findings of fact, are at issue in the instant case, these 
cases are inmaterial. More importantly, contrary to petitioner's 
claim this court and the Industrial Commission have previously 
refused apportionment in the presence of a finding of pre-existing 
disability. See Duane Brown Chevrolet Company v. Industrial Com-
mission, 29 Utah 2d 478, 511 P.2d 743 (1973), and Mountain States 
Steel Company v. Industrial Commission, 535 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1975). 
In each of these cases awards of total liability against an em-
ployer for injuries which only aggravated prior conditions were .. 
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upheld by this court over an appeal for apportionment by the re-
spective employers. In light of these cases the Industrial Com-
mission's award in Mrs, Ortega's case is clearly neither arbitrary 
nor contrary to law, 
POINT II 
CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY 
PAYMENTS DURING THE PERIOD OF MEDICAL TREATMENT. 
The Industrial Commission's order directed petitioner 
to continue paying temporary total disability compensation 
to Mrs. Ortega "... until claimant is released for work activities 
..." (Finding of Fact No. 5, Industrial Commission Order of 
April 2, 1976). Mrs. Ortega has not yet been released for 
work activities by her treating psychiatrist. 
Petitioner asserts that since Mrs. Ortega has been 
transferred from in-patient to out-patient status, and a find-
ing has been made in respect to permanent partial disability, 
that she can no longer be considered totally disabled. Both 
aspects of the preceding argument are clearly in error. First, 
a transfer from in-patient to out-patient status in no way 
implies that the patient is no longer totally disabled. Many 
conditions which would undeniably be considered totally disabling 
can be treated on an out-patient basis. Intermountain should 
be well aware of this since it is itself a health care organi-
zation. Continuous hospitalization would be absolutely neces-
sary only if Mrs. Ortega were completely psychotic or otherwise 
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incapable of assuming any responsibility for her behavior. 
That is not the case here; Mrs. Ortega's symptoms are chronic 
severe pain. Mrs. Ortega was transferred from in-patient to 
out-patient status because she found the environment of the 
psychiatric ward at the University Medical Center so intolerable 
that it aggravated her condition. 
Intermountain's claim that a finding of permanent 
partial disability implies a condition sufficiently stabilized 
that it can no longer be termed totally disabled is equally 
illogical. It need only be pointed out again that the finding 
of the medical panel as to permanent partial disability is 
a tentative conclusion, expressly set for reconsideration as 
psychiatric treatment progresses. Claimant's condition can 
therefore hardly be termed stabilized. 
The central issue here is whether Mrs. Ortega is 
capable of returning to work at this time. Her treating psychia-
trist indicates she is not. Petitioner has presented no evidence 
to challenge the doctor's conclusion. Therefore, the Industrial 
Commission's finding that Mrs. Ortega continues to be totally 
disabled and ordering payments accordingly is neither arbitary 
nor capricious. 
POINT III 
IT IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAW FOR THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION TO ORDER TREATMENT WITHOUT SPECIFYING A LIMIT ON COSTS 
FROM THE OUTSET. 
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As a practical matter, the Industrial Commission is 
unable in many cases to fix the costs of rehabilitation and 
treatment for the injuries involved. Accordingly, in modern 
practice the Industrial Commission specifies the type of treat-
ment required but not necessarily the costs unless they can be 
accurately determined at that time. To require otherwise would 
be a pointless effort. The expenses incurred are determined by 
those individuals and organizations which provide the treatment. 
Having the Industrial Commission declare a sum beforehand would 
have no effect on these costs. Secondly, if a sum were set ini-
tially, the Commission would just continue to adjust it to re-
flect the real costs as treatment proceeded. Specific authority 
to make such continuing adjustments is conferred on the Commis-
sion by U.C.A. 35-1-78 (as amended 1953). 
Petitioner cites Carbon Fuel Company v. Industrial Com-
mission, 81 Utah 156, 17 P.2d 215 (1932) as authority for the re-
quirement upon the Commission to state a final cost of treatment 
in its original order. - That case interpreted a statute which is 
the present day 35-1-81. However, as written in 1932 this act 
stated a limit on benefits and investigatory requirements in 
relation any final awards in excess of $500.00 which have since 
been repealed. The holding in this case was basically tied in 
with the courtfs interpretation of the demand the legislature 
intended to impose on the Industrial Commission by these pro-
visions since repealed. The case, therefore, has little con-
tinuing validity. 
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Of course, even under the new law the Industrial Com-
mission cannot cease supervising the expenses incurred in treat-
ment of Mrs. Ortega's condition. A similar situation resulting 
in this court finding a requirement of continuing supervision 
was presented in Utah Construction Company v. Matheson, 534
 i 
P.2d 1238 (1975). However, an order specifying just such super-
vision was entered by the Industrial Commission in its supple-
mental order of June 21, 1976. ( 
The Industrial Commission's award in Mrs. Ortega's 
case is in full compliance with U.C.A. 35-1-81, the law in 
force today, and the requirements of continuing supervision i 
over longterm medical treatment stated in the Utah Construction 
case, supra, and, therefore, should be sustained by this court. 
CONCLUSION I 
In reviewing any order of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, this court must find that the Commission's action was suffi-
ciently arbitrary and capricious to amount to an abuse of its dis- • 
cretion before it may overturn that order. In this case, the peti-
tioner, Intermountain Health Care, has presented no evidence of 
any such abuse of discretion. It has failed to show that the In- * 
dustrial Commission's interpretation of U.C.A. 35-1-69 is incompa-
tible with that act or inconsistent with this court's interpreta-
tion of that act. In addition, there is substantial evidence in * 
the record that the Industrial Commission's order was specifically 
patterned after cases decided by this court interpreting Section 
35-1-69 of the Utah Code. Petitioner Intermountain has likewise 
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failed to produce any plausible evidence that the Commission abused 
its discretionary duties in awarding Mrs, Ortega temporary total 
disability benefits during the period her treating r>hysician has 
not released her for work. Finally, petitioner Intermountain has 
failed to produce any evidence or case authority that the Commis-
sion is not empowered to provide for long term medical treatment 
of a condition without specifying the ultimate cost of that treat-
ment. In fact, there is substantial evidence and case authority 
for the opposite claim, namely, that so long as the Industrial Com-
mission supervises the long term medical treatment of a party eli-
gible for workmen's compensation benefits it may enter its 
order without specifying ultimate costs. To require otherwise 
would merely impose an impractical burden on the Industrial 
Commission which would ultimately have no effect whatsoever 
on the final costs of treatment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. BRANDT 
Attorney for Claimant Mary Jean 
Ortega 
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